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In this paper we question the one-sided thesis that contemporary organizations rely on the 
mobilization of cognitive capacities. We suggest that severe restrictions on these 
capacities in the form of what we call functional stupidity are an equally important if 
under-recognized part of organizational life. Functional stupidity refers to an absence of 
reflexivity, a refusal to use intellectual capacities in other than myopic ways and 
avoidance of justifications. We argue that functional stupidity is prevalent in contexts 
dominated by economy in persuasion which emphasizes image and symbolic 
manipulation. This gives rise to forms of stupidity management that repress or 
marginalize doubt and block communicative action. In turn, this structures individuals’ 
internal conversations in ways that emphasize positive and coherent narratives and 
marginalize more negative or ambiguous ones. This can have productive outcomes such 
as providing a degree of certainty for individuals and organizations. But it can have 
corrosive consequences such as creating a sense of dissonance among individuals and the 
organization as a whole. The positive consequences can give rise to self-reinforcing 
stupidity. The negative consequences can spark dialogue, which may undermine 









An enormous body of writing on knowledge, information, competence, wisdom, 
resources, capabilities, talent and learning in organizations has emerged in recent 
decades, in which there is a common assumption of ‘smartness’. Although this term has 
not been used systematically in the study of organizations, it captures the underlying 
premise that a vital issue for contemporary organizations is their ability intelligently to 
mobilize cognitive capacities. This assumption is evident in claims that ‘as the pace of 
change increases, knowledge development among the members of the company becomes 
the key to competitiveness, to remaining in the front line … Business has simply become 
more knowledge-intensive in all companies, and corporate investment in education and 
training is more extensive than ever before’ (Wikström and Normann, 1994, p. 1-2). 
Some authors point out that ‘workers’ cognitive and social capabilities are elements of 
the forces of production and, over the long term and in broad aggregate, the pressure of 
competition forces firms and societies to upgrade those capabilities. The development of 
capitalism thus tends to create a working class that is increasingly sophisticated’ (Adler, 
2002, p. 392). Similarly, two management gurus (Davenport and Prusak, 1998, p.88) 
have suggested that the most effective way for firms to remain competitive is to ‘hire 
smart people and let them talk to one another’.    
 
These broad claims are mirrored in one of the central leitmotifs of contemporary 
organization theory: firms thrive on the basis of their knowledge (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Spender, 1996; Grant, 1996). Knowledge is seldom 
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clearly defined, but is considered ‘the most strategically important of the firm’s 
resources’ (Grant, 1996, p. 110) and ‘the central competitive dimension of what firms 
know how to do is to create and transfer knowledge efficiently within an organizational 
context’ (Kogut and Zander, 1992, p. 384). Researchers take it for granted that ‘the 
foundation of industrial economies has shifted from natural resources to intellectual 
assets’ (Hansen et al., 1999, p. 106) and that ‘many sectors are animated by new 
economics, where the payoff to managing knowledge astutely has been dramatically 
amplified’ (Teece, 1998, p. 55). For some, a ‘new paradigm’ of management has 
appeared which means ‘tacit and local knowledge of all members of the organization is 
the most important factor in success, and creativity creates its own prerogative’ (Clegg et 
al., 1996, p. 205). Underpinning all this is the assumption that the intelligent mobilization 
of cognitive capacities is central to the operation of (successful) organizations.  
 
There are of course ongoing controversies about what exactly constitutes knowledge in 
contemporary organizations (e.g. Blackler, 1995; Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001; Scherer 
and Spender, 2007; Schultze and Stabell, 2004; Spender, 1998). Many of the references 
to ‘knowledge’ are vague and all-embracing (Schreyogg and Geiger, 2007). Nonetheless, 
the idea that valuable, rare and inimitable knowledge is significant to organizational 
performance has a strong rhetorical value. Instead of engaging in these debates about 
what knowledge ‘is’, we want to question the assumption in this field that sophisticated 
thinking and use of advanced knowledge, is a core characteristic of many contemporary 
organizations. We think this ‘broader set of assumptions ... shared by several different 
schools’ (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011, p. 225) needs to be challenged. It creates a one-
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sided, widely-shared and rather grandiose portrait of the smart, knowledge-based firm 
and its employees. This picture may be appealing, but it misses how effective 
organizational functioning calls also for qualities that do not easily fit with the idea of 
smartness.  
 
There is a huge body of work on non-rationality in organizations, which reminds us of the 
limitations to the intelligent mobilization of cognitive capacities. Some researchers 
document how cognitive limitations lead to practices that could be labelled ‘semi-
rational’ (e.g. March and Simon, 1958; Brunsson, 1985). Others highlight more serious 
forms of irrationality, which are produced by unconscious elements, group-think and 
rigid adherence to wishful thinking (e.g. Schwartz, 1990; Wagner, 2002). In our view, 
these studies miss a set of deviations from smartness, which are neither semi-rational nor 
purely stupid. To capture these processes, we propose the concept of functional stupidity.  
 
Functional stupidity is organizationally-supported lack of reflexivity, substantive 
reasoning and justification. It entails a refusal to use intellectual resources outside a 
narrow and ‘safe’ terrain. It can provide a sense of certainty that allows organizations to 
function smoothly. This can save the organization and its members from the frictions 
provoked by doubt and reflection. Functional stupidity contributes to maintaining and 
strengthening organizational order. It also can motivate people, help them to cultivate 
their careers and subordinate them to socially acceptable forms of management and 
leadership. Such positive outcomes can further reinforce functional stupidity. However, 
functional stupidity can also have negative consequences such as trapping individuals and 
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organizations into problematic patterns of thinking, which engender the conditions for 
individual and organizational dissonance. These negative outcomes may prompt 
individual and collective reflexivity in a way that can undermine functional stupidity.  
   
By advancing the concept of functional stupidity, we make three, overlapping 
contributions. First, we disturb a common field assumption that contemporary 
organizations operate mainly through the mobilization of cognitive capacities (e.g. 
Spender, 1996; Grant, 1996). We do this by pointing out how the denial of cognitive 
capabilities can actually facilitate organizational functioning. Second, we seek to extend 
existing accounts of the limits to rationality and thoughtfulness in organizations (e.g. 
March and Simon, 1958; Cohen et al., 1972; Ashforth and Fried, 1988; March, 1996), by 
providing a concept that allows us to account for how the use of cognitive capacities may 
be limited by relations of power and domination rather than a lack of time or resources, 
or cognitive fixations. Finally, we propose a concept and theoretical explanation for what 
we think is a pervasive, but largely unacknowledged aspect of organizational life. We 
think that the term ‘functional stupidity’ might be evocative and resonate with the 
experiences of researchers, practitioners, citizens and consumers. Thus, our approach 
may help to illuminate key experiences of people in organizations, that often are masked 
by dominant modes of theorizing which emphasize ‘positive’ themes, such as leadership, 
identity, culture, learning, core competence, innovation and networks. It should open up 
space for further in-depth empirical investigation of this topic. Through these three 
contributions we hope to offer an ‘interesting theory’ (Davis, 1971) that develops some 





To make our argument, we start by looking at existing concepts that have been mobilized 
by organization theorists to explore the other side to smartness, then introduce the 
concept of functional stupidity. We develop a general model of functional stupidity by 
identifying the contexts, triggering conditions, processes, outcomes and feedback loops. 
We conclude the paper by drawing out future lines of research and implications for 
practice.  
 
The Limits to Smartness 
 
There is a long history of work in organization theory that encourages caution in relation 
to rationality and smartness in organizations. Perhaps the best-known strand is the work 
that charts the limits to rationality in organizations. The concept of ‘bounded rationality’ 
captures actors’ inability to make completely rational decisions due to lack of time, 
information and information processing capacity (Simon, 1972). This means actors will 
make, at best, reasonable or acceptable decisions, but only within the bounds of the 
resources and time available. Some studies point to how much work is conducted in 
‘mindless’ ways (Ashforth and Fried, 1988). People carry out their tasks based on 
existing cognitive scripts that specify ‘a typical sequence of occurrences in a given 
situation’ ((Ashforth and Fried, 1988, p. 306). There are formal and informal procedures 
that guide responses to situations and demands. When learnt, these informal procedures 
make it possible for individuals to act without too much thinking, which promotes 
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cognitive efficiency. But learned scripts can blind their adherents to processes that fall 
squarely outside them.  
 
A similar idea is articulated by Argyris (1986) who points to the prevalence of ‘skilled 
incompetence’ in large organizations. He argues that many managers and professionals 
are skilled because they know what to do when faced with a situation, and often do it 
instantaneously. However they are incompetent insofar as this skill leads to ultimately 
negative outcomes by avoiding difficult and searching questions. Skilled incompetence is 
often reinforced by defensive routines in an organization. These are routines that make 
certain issues undiscussable and help managers to avoid surprise, embarrassment and 
threat. However, these routines also allow managers to avoid learning and inquiry into 
difficult questions. The result is that the organization becomes trapped into patterns 
where the very skills and abilities of employees lead to habitual avoidance of asking 
difficult but pressing questions.  
 
The garbage can model of decision-making (Cohen et al., 1972) places a greater 
emphasis on ambiguity, dynamics and unpredictability in organizations. It highlights how 
making decisions often involve a more or less random configuration of problems, 
solutions and opportunities. Building on this, March (1996) argues that ‘foolishness’ is 
required in complex environments with ambiguous goal preferences. Foolishness is an 
exploratory kind of reasoning whereby we act before we think. ‘Foolish’ action helps to 
clarify, shape and test preferences. It allows trial through action and imperviousness to 
feed-back. This facilitates new activities which have yet to show evidence of being 
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successful (March, 2006). Here, the high level of ambiguity simply prevents people from 
mobilizing their cognitive capacities fully, and acting rationally. 
 
Another strand of research highlights the role played by ignorance (e.g. Smithson, 1989; 
Roberts and Armitage, 2008; Ungar, 2008; Abbott, 2010). This work points out how ‘a 
lack of knowledge or awareness of where knowledge exists or, more precisely, is claimed 
to exist’ (Ungar, 2008, p. 303, emphasis in original) is an endemic aspect of modern 
knowledge intensive settings such as science or government policy making. This is 
because at the same time that modern fields of knowledge produce a sense of certainty 
about particular issues, they also create a sense of uncertainty about other issues. For 
instance, scientific inquiry into climate change has produced a sense of certainty about 
some issues (such as the long run increase in planetary heat in the last century), but also 
revealed new areas of ignorance (such as the precise causes of it) (Ungar, 2008). This 
kind of ‘expert’ or acknowledged ignorance sits alongside ‘amateur’ or denied ignorance 
(Abbott, 2010). An excellent example of this is a study that found that senior managers 
frequently were ignorant of the technical details of Total Quality Management 
programmes and, thus, had unrealistic expectations of to expect when they were adopted 
(Zbaraki, 1998). This highlights how ‘pseudo-knowledge’ allows people to confuse 
superficial familiarity with a deeper understanding of the subject matter. A belief in 
mastery and knowledge, then, hides a ‘deeper’ level of ignorance. 
 
The concepts of bounded-rationality, skilled incompetence, garbage-can decision making, 
foolishness, mindlessness and (denied) ignorance take us some way to understanding the 
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borders to smartness. However, we believe that there are sharper deviations from 
smartness that are not accurately captured by the concepts detailed above. These ideas 
hardly call into question the field assumptions that see the mobilization of cognitive 
capacities as central to organizational life. Many of the concepts discussed above tend to 
focus on the inevitable limitations of rational knowledge and intelligence. They also 
propose ‘softer’, more pragmatic versions. This means that the other side to smartness, 
which lies outside semi-rational functioning, is largely missed. The concept of ignorance 
focuses on content and indicates that just adding knowledge through the use of experts or  
education would deal with the issue. This tells us little about the limits to the active use 
(or non-use) of cognitive and intellectual capacities. Mindlessness is somewhat different 
because it points to how templates for cognition make routinized and efficient behaviour 
possible. It focuses on rather narrow and predictable elements such as cues and scripts. 
Like bounded rationality, this work often emphasizes a form of efficiency. By doing so, it 
largely ignores the broader issues of lack of reflection or questioning. Something similar 
can be said about Argyris’s (1986) idea of skilled incompetence, where the norms of 
efficient interaction sometimes mean that awareness of and dealing with problems is 
avoided. In addition, each of these concepts tends to have a cognitive bias towards 
‘embrained’ processing of knowledge. This focus tends to obfuscate affective or 
motivational issues including anxiety, uncertainty and unwillingness to disrupt 
organizational harmony or efforts to secure a sense of self. This research does not clarify 
how cognitive limitations are linked to affective issues. Perhaps even more importantly, 
this research does not consider how issues of power and politics may fuel the 
disinclination to use intellectual resources. To address these shortcomings, we introduce 
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the concept of functional stupidity. 
 
Functional Stupidity  
 
Stupidity resonates with many anecdotal accounts of organizational life. Seemingly 
normal and sensible organizations, such as the Ford Motor Company under the late Henry 
Ford, and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation during the tenure of J. Edgar Hoover, 
embody the pathologies of their very influential leaders (Kets de Vries, 1980). During the 
happy days of the ‘new economy’ in the late 1990s, many individuals and organizations 
developed an irrational exuberance for the Internet. The result was a premature 
willingness to over-value the potential of online ventures and side-step many normal 
practices of prudent investment (Valliere and Peterson, 2004). During the most recent 
financial crisis, many working in the financial industry placed irrational faith in their 
complex financial models (Lewis, 2011). This contributed to ignorance about the real 
risks that many financial institutions were running. In these cases, we find intelligent and 
knowledgeable people actively refraining from using their cognitive and reflexive 
capacity.  
 
These examples are forms of stupidity, in which there is clear deviation from ‘normal’ 
organizational functioning. But in many cases, stupidity is a normal feature of 
organizational life and is not so easily linked to negative outcomes. For instance, 
stupidity can be seen in the (non-)adoption of managerial practices. According to Pfeffer 
and Sutton (2006), most managerial practices are adopted on the basis of faulty 
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reasoning, accepted wisdom and complete lack of evidence. This is also emphasized in 
studies of management fashion (Abrahamson, 1996). Companies rarely adopt Human 
Resource Management practices that are good for employees and are profitable (Pfeffer, 
1994). When they do, they often stop using them after some time. If Pfeffer is right, this 
may appear as simply unintelligent or irrational, but this is hardly the full explanation. 
 
The example invites the suspicion that stupidity is systematic in organizations. Building 
on this suspicion we would argue that stupidity needs to be taken seriously, as a part of 
organizational life. Furthermore, we would claim that stupidity should not just be equated 
with pathology, irrationality or dysfunctional thinking which disrupt the smooth 
functioning of organization life. Rather, stupidity may be actively supported by 
organizations and may create rather ‘functional’ outcomes. We now explore in more 
depth how stupidity has been conceptualized and clarify the way we would like to 
approach it. 
 
In folk psychology stupidity is usually equated with some kind of mental deficiency. To 
be stupid at work is to suffer from what might be called an ‘epistemological lack’. To be 
stupid is not just (as is ignorance) to lack knowledge, it is also to lack the ability or 
willingness to use or process knowledge (Sternberg, 2002). Cognitive psychologists have 
pointed out that this may not be due only to a lack of intelligence needed to process 
knowledge, but may be because of a fixation within problematic algorithms of thought or 
a lack of willingness to question one’s own deeply held beliefs (Stanovich, 2002). 
Stupidity then is seen as the inability or unwillingness to mobilize one’s cognitive 
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resources and intelligence. Some suggest that stupidity is not just an expression of 
individual cognitive features, but is actually encouraged by broader modes of modern 
knowledge (Ronell, 2002) or organizational cultures (ten Bos, 2007). This suggests that 
stupidity in an organizational context is an organizationally supported inability or 
unwillingness to mobilize one’s cognitive capacities.  
 
Taking these ideas further, we can view what we refer to as functional stupidity as being 
characterized by an unwillingness or inability to mobilize three aspects of cognitive 
capacity: reflexivity, justification and substantive reasoning. Lack of reflexivity involves 
an inability or unwillingness to question knowledge claims and norms (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg, 2009). This happens when members of an organization do not call into 
question the dominant beliefs and expectations they encounter in organizational life. 
Organizational rules, routines and norms are thought to be given, natural and good (or 
unproblematic or inevitable) and, therefore, not worth thinking about in negative terms. 
For instance, employees may not consider or question organizational (im)morality 
because ‘what is right in the corporation is what the guy above you wants from you’ 
(Jackall, 1988, p. 6). Such a lack of doubt involves the repression of organizational 
members’ capacities to use reason, to scrutinize and criticize aspects of an organization. 
 
The second aspect of functional stupidity is lack of justification. This entails actors not 
demanding or providing reasons and explanation (cf. Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). 
Given relatively ‘open’ social conditions (such as freedom of speech), individuals tend to 
consider all statements in terms of sincerity, legitimacy and truthfulness. They are also 
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inclined to argue or ask for justification when confronted with what is viewed as 
problematic validity claims. This is what Habermas (1984) refers to as communicative 
action - a dialogue that creates views and norms that are well-grounded in arguments. By 
not asking for justification, individuals are disinclined to engage in dialogue or ask for 
rationales for doing something. This often means assuming that an account of the reasons 
for a decision or action is not required. Not requiring justifications allows practices to be 
accepted without any significant critical scrutiny or robust process of reason-giving. For 
instance, organizations will often adopt new practices with few robust reasons beyond the 
fact that they make the company ‘look good’ or that ‘others are doing it’ (Alvesson, 
2013a; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zabracki, 1998). Refraining from asking for 
justification beyond managerial edict, tradition or fashion, is a key aspect of functional 
stupidity. It also results in the reproduction of problematic conditions and a shortage of 
what is sometimes referred to as ‘voice’ in the organization (Morrison, 2011). 
 
The third aspect of functional stupidity is a lack of substantive reasoning. This happens 
when cognitive resources are concentrated around a small set of concerns that are defined 
by a specific organizational, professional or work logic. It entails the myopic application 
of instrumental rationality focused on the efficient achievement of a given end, and 
ignorance of the broader substantive questions about what that end actually is (Alvesson 
and Willmott, 2012). For instance, an accountant may compress a broad range of issues 
into recordable numbers, thereby ignoring many of the more substantive debates around 
what those numbers exactly represent and the moral implications associated with using 
those numbers in decision making (Dillard and Ruchala, 2005). This is a form of 
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stupidity because it can halt a reasoned investigation and consideration of the possible 
links and implications of one’s action. Instead, it frames questions in very narrow and 
focused ways.  
 
Functional stupidity is not a purely cognitive issue. It is related also to affective issues 
such as motivation and emotion. The motivational aspect involves an unwillingness to 
use one’s cognitive capacities. A lack of curiosity, closed-mindedness, identity 
construction as an ‘organizational person’ or a ‘professional’ (who is inclined to see the 
organizational or occupational paradigm as unquestionable), can be a very important 
barrier to broader thinking. Related to this are emotional aspects of functional stupidity. 
Anxiety at work and personal insecurity may reinforce functional stupidity. It is 
important to realize that emotions are key elements in how we relate to and interpret the 
world, which often informs cognitive processes (Jaggar, 1989). In this sense, there is 
interplay between inability and unwillingness: the more the ability, the less that 
willingness is needed. In contrast huge willingness may lead to efforts to compensate for 
ability, which could result in efforts to transcend – or perhaps reduce – forms of 
functional stupidity. This, of course, is not just a matter of individual capacity and 
motivation. Societal, organizational and occupational contexts are central (Ronell, 2002; 
ten Bos, 2007). These can cultivate or discourage thoughtfulness, critical reasoning and 
dialogue. Here, the mechanisms of power are important, including disciplinary power 
which form a specific subject around the norms ofbeing. 
 
Although we draw attention to organizations as generators of functional stupidity, there 
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are some occasions when narrow thinking deviates from the dominant norms of an 
organization. After all, most organizations prescribe certain degrees of reflexivity, 
justification and substantive reasoning. However, in many instances being reflexive, 
requiring justifications and engaging in substantive reasoning are not accepted as normal 
parts of organizational life. In some cases these demands might be considered a pesky 
waste of time. In other cases, they may be thought of as dangerous or potentially 
subversive activities that must be actively discouraged and sanctioned. This kind of 
organization supported stupidity can certainly have negative consequences such as 
decreased autonomy and organizational mistakes. However, it can also have some 
significant benefits such as ensuring that organizations function smoothly. Stupidity, 
therefore, is a mixed blessing for organizations – and for the people in them. It 
encourages organizational members to refrain from asking difficult questions. It also 
facilitates employees to play along with the dominant norms. But it can be seen as 
ungrounded faith in the visions, goals, strategies and practices of an organization that 
helps members to control their doubts. It typically has an individual side and an 
organizational side. It is both something individuals do and something that is cultivated 
within the organization as a whole.  
 
We can now offer a more comprehensive definition of our core concept - functional 
stupidity. For us functional stupidity is inability and/or unwillingness to use cognitive and 
reflective capacities in anything other than narrow and circumspect ways. It involves a 
lack of reflexivity, a disinclination to require or provide justification, and avoidance of 
substantive reasoning. It is related to the intertwined elements of cognition, motivation 
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and emotion. In many cases functional stupidity can produce positive outcomes in the 
form of significant benefits to organizations and employees. The narrow and circumspect 
use of reason, high levels of means-ends oriented intelligence, and the partly positive 
outcomes, differentiate functional stupidity from ‘pure’ stupidity. Thus, the use of 
intelligence and functional stupidity may co-exist. Intelligent people (who score high on 
IQ tests for instance) are not immune to functional stupidity (Ronell, 2002).  
 
A good illustration of functional stupidity is the commitment to information in 
organizations. Feldman and March (1981), some time ago, noted an excessive interest 
and focus on information. People require it, talk about it, have strategies and tactics 
related to it, and complain about shortages of it. At the same time, they feel there is too 
much of it. People do not have the time and interest really to use it. In short, there is an 
over-interest in and under-use of information. Feldman and March suggest that the 
preoccupation with information is widespread due to the high cultural value attributed to 
information. Information symbolizes reason, reliability, security, even intelligence. 
Mobilizing information is thus more a matter of legitimation than functionality: ‘Using 
information, asking for information, and justifying decisions in terms of information have 
all come to be significant ways in which we symbolize that the process is legitimate, that 
we are good decision makers, and that our organizations are well managed’ (Feldman and 
March, 1981, p. 178).  
 
Paradoxically, it is the cultural value placed on information as a key element in 
rationality that accounts for the over-emphasis on information. An over-focus on 
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information prevents its practical use. This myopic focus on information is underpinned 
by an inability or unwillingness to think about the substantive reasons associated with the 
use of information, to ask for justifications for demands for information, and to engage in 
broader reflexive thinking about information. Such a strong focus on information gives 
the impression of full use of cognitive capacity, and a sense of competence and 
organizational rationality. However, at the same time, it hides the functional stupidity in 
confusing information with rationality.  
 
  
Dynamics of Functional Stupidity  
 
We have argued that functional stupidity is a general element of organizational processes 
rather than an issue only of individual cognition. To understand functional stupidity in 
organizations, we need to consider broader social and organizational dynamics. In our 
view, functional stupidity is prompted by the contemporary economy of persuasion which 
emphasizes symbolic rather than substantive aspects of organizational life. In 
organizations this encourages a major focus on symbolic manipulation – often in the form 
of attempts to develop strong corporate cultures and identities, corporate branding and 
charismatic leadership, exercised often through stupidity management. This happens 
when various actors (including managers and senior executives as well as external figures 
such as consultants, business gurus and marketers) exercise power to block 
communicative action. The result is that adherence to managerial edicts is encouraged, 
and criticism or reflection on them is discouraged. Externally imposed attempts to 
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regulate the use of cognitive capacities are taken up by employees through what we call 
stupidity self management. This happens when employees limit internal reflexivity by 
cutting short ‘internal conversations’. This helps them to marginalize doubts and focus on 
more positive and coherent understandings of reality. Ambiguities are repressed and a 
false sense of certainty about organizational processes emerges. This can give rise to a 
sense of certainty that produces functionality for both the organization as a whole and the 
individuals within it. Such positive outcomes can have self-reinforcing effects by further 
encouraging stupidity management and self-stupidity management. However, functional 
stupidity also can produce individual and organizational dissonances that are difficult to 
avoid. When acknowledged, this dissonance can encourage reflexivity, which, in turn, can 
undermine self-imposed limits on internal reflexivity and socially imposed blocks on 
communicative action. This can have the effect of corroding stupidity management as 
well as stupidity self-management. In what follows, we develop this argument (see: 
Figure 1). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Context: Economy of Persuasion and Symbolic Manipulation 
 
 
The developed economies have witnessed an explosion of economies of persuasion. 
These are economies in which the manufacture of seductive images has become 
increasingly central to work and to organizations (Alvesson, 2013a; Foley, 2010; Klein, 
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2000). Such economies emerge against a backdrop of an economy of (post-) affluence 
where much of what organizations produce does not find spontaneous demand (Galbraith, 
1958; Lasch, 1979). This means organizations devote a significant proportion of their 
efforts to creating demand for their products by promoting expectations, producing 
images and influencing desires. Certainly, not all aspects of developed economies are 
obsessively focused on image production and circulation. There are sectors of the 
economy that focus mainly on more traditional forms of production (such as agriculture 
or manufacturing) or product development (research and development-based industries). 
In addition, Western economies are made up of large numbers of organizations engaged 
in the provision of routine services (Fleming et al., 2004; Sweet and Meiskens, 2008). 
Nonetheless, image intensive economic activity has become increasingly ‘hegemonic’ 
insofar as organizations engaged in extremely mundane activities are focusing significant 
proportions of their resources on image crafting activities (Arvidsson, 2006; Kornberger, 
2010).   
 
In economies of persuasion, activities such as branding, marketing, public relations, sales 
and image building, often become more significant than production (Alvesson, 1990). 
This can weaken ‘substance’ and ‘craft’ as the key features of organizations (Sennett, 
2006, 2008) and emphasize symbolic manipulation. This involves the crafting of images 
and the engineering of fantasies (Alvesson, 1990). Such activities are directed mainly at 
external groups such as customers, stakeholders and the broader public (Hatch and 
Schultz, 2003). However, symbolic manipulation can also be directed at employees. 
Employee-focused campaigns indicate appropriate feelings, convictions and identities 
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(Hancock, 1999). They can take the form of corporate culture initiatives (Casey, 1995), 
branding programmes (Kärreman and Rylander, 2008), organizational identity building 
(Dutton et al., 1994), efforts to infuse spirituality into the workplace (Bell and Taylor 
2003), linking work to the pursuit of social good (Fleming, 2009), a focus on exciting 
activities, such as leadership, rather than mundane administration (Alvesson and 
Sveningsson, 2003) and use of increasingly hollow status markers such as pretentious 
titles, impressive policies that are decoupled from practice, and other grandiose 
representations (Alvesson, 2013a). While the precise content of these programmes may 
differ, they are all efforts to persuade and seduce employees into believing in something 
that improves the image of their organizations, their work and, ultimately, themselves.  
 
Major efforts to create a favourable image of the organization for employees are not 
always entirely successful. Some employees will resist symbolic manipulation through 
overt responses such as workplace counter cultures (Collinson, 1992) or more covert 
cynicism (Fleming and Spicer, 2003; Fleming, forthcoming). Others will be ambivalent 
(Whittle, 2005). However, a significant proportion of employees will ‘buy in’ to this 
symbolic manipulation, and become extremely devoted to the firm, enthusiastically 
accepting and embracing its corporate values (Alvesson, 1995; Casey, 1995; Kunda, 
1992). Many employees operate in contexts that value and reward conformity more than 
autonomy and independent thinking (Willmott, 1993). The implication is that well 
functioning employees are expected to adhere to this image. They must be persuaded, to 
persuade themselves and to persuade others about the positive qualities of the 
organization and its outputs. Of course, people can act strategically and be cynical, but a 
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belief in image production makes persuasion of others easier, more credible and 
ultimately can create a more positive organizational climate and work experience 
 
 
Organizational Trigger: Stupidity Management 
 
Organizational contexts dominated by widespread attempts at symbolic manipulation 
typically involve managers seeking to shape and mould the ‘mind-sets’ of employees 
(Willmott, 1993). A core aspect of this involves seeking to create some degree of good 
faith and conformity and to limit critical thinking (Fleming, forthcoming). Attempts to 
shape the psychological, emotional and moral orientations of employees are found not 
just in symbolic intensive organizations; they are aspects of contemporary management 
and organization generally (Alvesson, 2013b). Well-known manufacturing firms such as 
Ford (Parker, 2000), and large public sector bureaucracies such as the English civil 
service (du Gay, 1999), sought to infuse particular cultural values into their employees. 
However, it is in ‘postmodern’, image-obsessed organizations that attempts to manage 
culture, images and brands have become primary managerial tasks. A key element here is 
stupidity management, which occurs when a range of actors seeks to limit the fully shared 
exercise of employees’ cognitive capacities. It involves the management of 
consciousness, clues about how to understand and relate to the world, and regulation of 
the processes through which consciousness is negotiated among the actors. A range of 
organizational actors including peers, junior and senior managers and external figures 




Stupidity management is typically underpinned by blocking communicative action. The 
dynamics of communicative action are inter-subjective reasoning and dialogue through 
which ‘actors seek to reach an understanding about their action situation and their plans 
of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement’ (Habermas, 1984, p. 
101). Communicative action can be blocked when there is systematically distorted 
communication that prevents the emergence of dialogues that allow validity claims to be 
questioned, and the search for good reasons for accepting a truth or normative claim is 
cut short (Forester, 2003; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007, 2011). In organizations, blocking 
communicative action entails encouraging adherence to certain beliefs and practices and 
discouragement of critical thinking about them (Deetz, 1992). Stupidity management 
involves a strong emphasis on positive understanding of organizational practices. This 
happens through uplifting messages such as organizational visions, missions, values and 
strategies that promise an impressive, up-beat and identity-confirming organizational 
world. Independent thinking is discouraged by an emphasis on the rationality of formal 
structures and procedures and the imitation of others in order to make things look good 
and legitimate. This is a key element in institutional processes, although not directly 
pointed to by proponents of institutional theory, who see this as a neutral and natural 
process (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Stupidity management also counteracts 
thoughtfulness and the exploration of doubt. It entails monitoring and more-or-less subtle 
sanctioning of subordinates and colleagues who raise issues that go beyond narrow, 




A central aspect of blocking communicative action is the exercise of power. We 
acknowledge that the concept of power is an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Lukes, 
2005; Clegg et al., 2006). However, for our present purposes we take it to broadly entail 
the ‘dimension of relationships through which the behaviours, attitudes, or opportunities 
of an actor are affected by another actor, system, or technology’ (Lawrence et al., 2012 p. 
105). Power can be exercised in at least four ways (Fleming and Spicer, 2007): direct 
suppression, setting the agenda, shaping ideological settings, and the production of 
subject positions. Let us look a little closer at each of these modes of exercise of power in 
the context of stupidity management.     
 
In some cases, stupidity management involves direct attempts to suppress communicative 
action. Sometimes this happens through direct warnings and interventions. In extreme 
cases employees are asked deliberately to cultivate their stupidity. For instance, an 
advertising agency director advised his copywriters never to visit the factories producing 
the items they were promoting. He argued that knowing the truth about the manufacturing 
process and the products would make it difficult to write the kind of copy (by his own 
admission, often superficial nonsense) that needed to be included in the advert (cited in 
Klein, 2000). In an even more extreme example, the director of another advertising firm 
asked his employees to ‘walk in stupid every morning’ (Burrell, 2007). Direct 
interventions to encourage functional stupidity can occur in more subtle ways. This may 
happen when stupidity managers seek to steer employees away from issues that go 
outside proscribed cognitive or ideological boundaries. For instance, employees in a large 
corporate bureaucracy who raised ethical issues were deemed to have odd ideas and to be 
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not fully reliable for important tasks and positions (Jackall, 1988). Similarly, junior 
consultants in a management consultancy firm who talked negatively about extreme work 
pressure associated with understaffing were considered ‘show-stoppers’ (Kärreman and 
Alvesson, 2009). Arguably, organizations are full of more or less systematic, explicit or 
clear examples of persuasions and sanctioning, which block processes of communicative 
action by ensuring that people do not raise wider issues in exploratory or critical 
discussions. As the airing of problems and critique are prohibited, the capacity to engage 
in critical reflection is reduced. 
 
Stupidity management can also work without direct intervention (through subtle or more 
active means). It can entail setting the agenda around what can and cannot be raised 
during collective deliberation. This may operate through purposeful attempts by 
management to manipulate the agenda. For instance, employees in an IT consultancy who 
wanted to discuss problems were met with the response that criticisms were allowable 
only if accompanied by constructive proposals for how to deal with them (Alvesson, 
1995). In this case, such issues would make it onto the agenda for legitimate discussion 
and consideration only if coupled with ‘constructive suggestions’. This marginalized 
broader critical discussion which was not accompanied by immediate solutions. Thus, 
deeper deliberation can be curtailed by defining what is worth discussing and what 
should be considered irrelevant. This can significantly narrow the scope of issues to 
which the employees’ cognitive capacities might be applied, and how they might be used.  
    
Stupidity managers may seek to block processes of communicative action by propagating 
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broader ideological frameworks that define the preferences and underpinning 
assumptions of the actors engaged in the deliberation. Sometimes ideological frameworks 
are intentionally propagated. They can be expressed through cultural management that 
emphasizes ideals and values, and also in more subtle ways. For instance, some 
organizations have a set of ideological values that celebrates action (Brunsson, 1982). In 
these organizations, too much deep consideration and analysis of a particular issue is 
actively discouraged in favour of quick and decisive action. This means employees are 
frequently asked to follow the corporate cliché: ‘stop thinking about it and start doing it’. 
For instance, in organizations undertaking change programmes, reflexivity and careful 
consideration of consequences are discouraged in favour of showing that things are being 
done (Watson, 1994). The result is that changes ‘are pushed through by managers trying 
to make a reputation and a career, who do not stay on to see them through’ (Watson, 
1994, p. 117). Of course, there are times when there is a need to act quickly and 
decisively due to a clear and present danger (Grint, 2005). However, these genuine 
emergencies are rare. Often, a clear orientation to action is driven less by a pressing 
situation than by an action orientation. 
 
A final way that stupidity managers might seek to exercise power is through the 
propagation of particular subject positions. This entails the construction and propagation 
of particular organizationally sponsored identities (Knights and Willmott, 1989). An 
excellent example of this is general celebration and propagation of the subject position of 
‘leader’ – and its corollary of ‘the follower’ (Alvesson and Spicer, 2011). Empirical 
studies show that many middle managers adopt the identity of ‘the leader’ because it 
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gives them a sense of self esteem (Alvesson and Svenningsson, 2003). Recent work on 
the restructuring of the UK public sector has traced how a widespread attachment to 
‘leaderism’ (O’Reilly and Reed, 2010) has significantly narrowed the scope of potential 
identities available in public sector organizations (Ford et al., 2008). This can 
significantly restrict how organizational members can use their cognitive capacities. 
Sometimes such restrictions occur through the promotion of ‘inspirational’ 
understandings of leadership coupled with ‘strong’ cultures and ‘cultish’ features 
(Tourish and Pinnington, 2002). However, in many contemporary workplaces, 
humanistic modes of ‘facilitative’, ‘authentic’ or ‘transformational’ leadership have 
replaced authoritarian forms of leadership (Alvesson and Spicer, 2011). This does not 
liberate communicative action. Rather, the assumption that leaders are morally, 
spiritually or socially superior to their followers endures (Alvesson, 2013a). The 
assumption is that the strong leader sets the path, creates enthusiasm, builds a feeling of 
belonging to a team, provides employees with the right ideas and orchestrates personal 
growth. A true follower relies heavily on the leader to do the thinking and decision-
making about the key issues, such as visions, strategies, values and identities. Co-workers 
are expected to adapt follower positions and passively to accept what the leader suggests 
(e.g. Hartnell and Walumbwa, 2011). The more emphasis on leadership, the more 
frequent the elements of followership and subordination. This marginalizes the use of 
critical reflection on the activities one is being led to accomplish. Of course, after careful 
deliberation, an individual or group may decide that leader and follower identities are 
required (Alvesson and Spicer, 2012). However, complete absence of deliberation about 





In sum, stupidity management involves a wide range of actors seeking to restrict and 
distort communicative action through the exercise of power. This can occur through 
direct interventions, agenda setting, propagating broader ideological beliefs and creating 
subject positions. However, two points of qualification are worth adding. First, these 
processes of stupidity management are not mutually exclusive: they may work in tandem. 
Returning to the IT consultancy study mentioned above (Alvesson, 1995), we see that all 
four modes of power are at work simultaneously. The managerial assertion that 
employees should criticize only if they have constructive proposals for solutions, can be 
seen as a direct expression of power (shut up!), agenda controlling (‘postpone raising the 
issue until you have come up with a solution’), an assertion of ideology (‘be positive and 
constructive, don’t complain’), and a form of identity creation (‘Be a good organizational 
citizen’). Second, the forms of stupidity management we mention can work through 
episodic interventions as well developing more systemic restrictions on communicative 
action (Lawrence et al., 2012). The former are interventions in specific situations; the 
latter refer to developing and maintaining the cultural and institutional grounding that 
supports socialized and/or organizationally ingrained capacities for functional stupidity. 
In this sense more systematic stupidity management plays a role in maintaining the 
broader features of context, which we discussed in the previous section. Often these two 
forms of management work together. For instance, emphasis on the importance of being 
consistent with the company’s brand not only narrows processes of collective 
deliberation but also can reproduce the broader economy of persuasion (Kärreman and 
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Rylander, 2008).  
 
 
Process: Stupidity Self-Management  
 
We argued above that functional stupidity is triggered by various forms of stupidity 
management that discourage reflection and critical thinking. This prompts constraints on 
individuals employment of their own cognitive capacities. Individuals do this by 
engaging in a process of stupidity self-management, involving the individual putting aside 
doubts, critique and other reflexive concerns and focusing on the more positive aspects of 
organizational life which are more clearly aligned with understandings and interpretations 
that are officially sanctioned and actively promoted. Negative aspects of organizational 
life, including doubts about the meaningfulness of work and production, are 
marginalized. This encourages a relatively coherent and positive self-narrative that 
generates a sense of faith and optimism on the part of organizational members. It means 
also that individuals are likely to avoid interaction and communication when there are 
doubts, critique or when justifications are called for. This ultimately creates a sense of 
certainty and consistency. In what follows, we unpack this process in more detail. 
 
When individuals are confronted with an organizational context that they find 
problematic, but which includes no space for doubts or objections, they react in different 
ways (Ogbonna and Harris, 2002). Some subjectively distance themselves from the 
organization and engage in an internal process of reflexivity. Others take a pragmatic 
approach, subjectively distancing themselves while behaving more or less according to 
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the organizational norms. A third group may sign up to and even ‘internalize’ dominant 
notions. The individuals in this third group bring their own senses of self into alignment 
with the dominant themes in the organization (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002). This can be 
seen as a process of limiting internal reflexivity (Archer, 2003, 2007; Mutch, 2007). It 
involves more or less active management of the individual’s reflection on his or her own 
personal project. When collective processes of reflexivity are blocked, many individuals 
refrain from engaging in a dialogue with themselves in such a way that unsettling 
substantive questions are quashed, as are the search for justifications or reflexive 
examination of one’s basic premise. Typically, we need some confirmation of our 
feelings of doubt. If people around us discourage efforts to explore substantive questions 
through dialogue, then the theme may be dropped or marginalized. This is not to suggest 
that internal reflexivity completely ends or does not take place. Rather, it is carefully 
managed and directed in such a way that negative and contradictory lines of thought are 
curtailed. In cutting short the internal conversation, a kind of ‘intra-communicative 
distortion’ occurs. This means employees are able to avoid experiences of anxiety and 
uncertainty that accompany contradictions. The wealth of positive representations offered 
by economies of persuasion may influence the internal conversation and make the 
individual more inclined to move away from independent, reflexive and critical thinking. 
 
A crucial part of this involves focusing on more positive and ‘safer’ aspects of 
organizational life. Individuals do this through using representations that are officially 
sanctioned by the organization. Some examples include versions of corporate reality 
manifested in power point presentations, corporate strategy statements and dominant 
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understandings of the corporate culture. This means that the individual’s own internal 
reflexivity does not radically clash with the dominant representations in the organization. 
It reduces the possibility for dissonance, provides a sense of existential security and gives 
the individual a sense of protection from sanctions. This sense of protection and security 
comes from the individual being able to avoid demanding thinking, concerns about their 
sense of self and the risk of disapproval from authorities and peers. People do not insist 
too much on thinking for themselves, but assume that management knows best and/or 
that fashion or tradition represents superior knowledge. A positive sense of self follows 
from identification with positively framed organizational discourses. Subjective 
attachment to the notions of well-structured career progression (Alvesson and Kärreman, 
2007), visionary and inspirational leadership (Conger et al., 2000), or being ‘world class’ 
(Prasad et al., 2011) can structure one’s internal conversation in positive and appealing 
ways.  
 
However, positive evocations frequently clash with the realities of work. Sometimes 
employees see work as boring, harsh, unethical or simply wrong in terms of productive 
arrangements and practices (Costas and Fleming, 2009). This clash between positive 
evocations encouraged by stupidity managers, and more negative experiences of 
everyday life, creates a significant sense of dissonance. This can lead to a range of 
resistant responses including alienation (Costas and Fleming, 2009), cynicism (Fleming 
and Spicer, 2003), activism (Spicer and Böhm, 2007) or exiting from the organization 
(Cederström and Fleming, 2012). However, it can lead also to more compliant responses, 
stupidity self-management being one. This entails employees dealing with dissonance by 
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bringing into line their espoused beliefs and their everyday experiences, and by ensuring 
that their internal narratives are based on a more positive understanding of their 
experience. Employees engage in a kind of pragmatic, non-reflective calculation whereby 
they work out what will be best for them, by at least symbolically accepting the ‘positive’ 
values prompted by the organization in order to get ahead (Ogbonna and Harris, 2002). 
To do this, employees selectively ‘edit’ their experiences so that they match the positive 
vision promoted by various stupidity managers.  
 
Because negative or contradictory experiences are mentally airbrushed from the picture, 
employees are able to maintain a relatively coherent and positive world-view. This gives 
them a sense that the ideas promoted by management are sincere and will prove 
beneficial. For instance, employees in a large professional services firm tended frequently 
to celebrate the meritocratic nature of the career paths and the managerial hierarchy in 
their organization. At the same time, they ignored many of the arbitrary ways the career 
system actually worked (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2007). By focusing on the more 
positive representations of the career system, many experiences of ‘imperfect’ practices 
were constructed as deviations rather than as indicative. They were seen also as an 
expression of individual circumstance rather than system failure. Employees in this firm 
reminded themselves of how ambitious the firm was in assessment and promotion 
matters. One consultant claimed that ‘[Other companies] know that we have rigorously 
tested them [the employees] before they were offered [a job] and that we also have 
developed and educated them. Our people are very attractive’ (p. Alvesson and 
Kärreman, 2007, p. 717). Considering formal structures and procedures rather than their 
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own experiences and observations allowed consultants to focus on a narrow range of 
positive and confirmatory experiences. This reduced complexity, and created a far more 
positive outlook. It depended on critical reflection being kept to a minimum, not asking 
for justifications and ignoring doubts related to the career system.   
 
By engaging in processes of stupidity self-management and cutting short the internal 
conversation, organizational members are able to push doubt and questioning to one side. 
This frequently means that employees can avoid expressing views on substantive 
problems, seeking justifications, and engaging in reflexive thinking. It means also that 
doubts tend not to be communicated and to fade away.  
 
Outcomes: Certainty and Dissonance  
 
Functional stupidity is a mixed blessing for organizations and the people in them. It can 
have positive results for both, but also less desirable outcomes. 
 
An important positive outcome of functional stupidity is that it provides a sense of 
certainty. Organizational members are able to adopt a more relaxed attitude to reflexivity, 
critical scrutiny or justification. For the individual, this minimizes disruptive reflection. 
Instead of shouldering the burden of doubt and risking the diversion of intellectual 
resources into ‘non-productive’ critical thinking, existential anxiety and other miseries, 
organizational members can plough their energies into negotiating the (post-) 
bureaucratic structures of the organization and building careers. The result is that 
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organizational life and one’s career involve much less friction. But perhaps more 
importantly, functional stupidity provides individuals with a positive sense of certainty 
about who they are, what they want and the steps they might need to take in order to get 
it. In this sense it helps to support feelings of coherence, distinctiveness, positive value 
and direction with regard to who one is, what one stands for and one’s trajectory 
(Alvesson et al., 2008). If an organizational member is able to block out or to minimize 
potential observations and experiences that discredit their identity project, they can avoid 
fragmentation, contradiction and vulnerability. This makes functional stupidity an 
important resource. 
 
Functional stupidity also provides a sense of certainty for the organization more broadly, 
because it discourages difficult questions from organizational members, requests for 
substantive reasons and broader justifications for actions, and the propagation of doubt 
through being reflexive. Questioning can be costly because it requires significant time 
and resources to engage in critical thinking. For instance, if organizations where called on 
frequently to justify their actions, they would need to devote significant resources to 
creating and articulating these justifications. In many cases the structures and actions of 
the organization would be difficult to justify, promoting doubt among organizational 
members. This could decrease legitimacy and dissolve commitment to uncertain courses 
of action (Brunsson, 1985). By cultivating functional stupidity, organizations are able to 
avoid the costs associated with broader critical thinking. By refraining from asking 
difficult and probing questions, they are able to create a sense of purposefulness and 





While functional stupidity can generate a sense of certainty, it can also have negative 
consequences. This can occur, when a large dissonance appears between official 
sponsored discourses (which are reinforced through stupidity management and stupidity 
self-management) and the lived realities of the individuals, and the organization as a 
whole. At the individual level, this can happen if limiting the exercise of cognitive 
capacities reduces autonomy, narrows the range of choices (opened up by reflection) or 
becomes a source of dissatisfaction over time, if and when it became clear that earlier 
thinking (or the shortage of it) had led to missed opportunities. It may throw doubt on the 
meaning and purposes of the individual’s working life. Reducing critical reflection may 
be reasonable in some cases, but in other cases, glaring contradictions and troubling 
ambiguities might be difficult to ignore. In such cases organizational members are faced 
with the question of whether they are willing to acknowledge these contradictions and 
face a corresponding loss of certainty. By acknowledging the dissonance, members may 
become increasingly disappointed about the distance between the rhetorical 
pronouncements of the organization and actual activities. This can lead to cynicism and 
alienation, decreased motivation and a highly limited sense of commitment to the 
organization (Fleming and Spicer, 2003; Costas and Fleming, 2009). It can also result in 
employees ending up on a career path that is not satisfying (Ibarra, 2003).  
 
The prevalence of functional stupidity can create significant problems also for the whole 
organization. This often occurs when the dissonance is prompted by mistakes caused by 
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avoidance or mis-recognition of problems. For instance, one of the most palpable drivers 
of accidents is an organizational or occupational culture that encourages people to avoid 
asking difficult questions and critiquing established frameworks of knowledge (e.g. 
Starbuck and Milliken, 1987). One of the drivers of the recent crisis within a number of 
financial institutions was an unwillingness to raise doubts about risky investment 
strategies (Lewis, 2011). This led many bankers to ignore increasingly large 
discrepancies between shared assumptions about markets, and reality. The eventual 
consequence of this was the collapse of many financial institutions and a broader 
systemic crisis.  
 
In sum, functional stupidity can be an advantage and/or a disadvantage. For instance, the 
norm of criticizing only if you have a constructive proposal, can lead to functional 
outcomes such as a good organizational climate and efforts to be creative. But it can have 
negative outcomes such as the suppression of awareness of problems, narrow 
instrumental orientation and lack of learning. 
 
Feedback: Self-Reinforcing Stupidity and Reflexivity  
 
Functional stupidity can have pervasive feedback effects. Perhaps one of the most 
pronounced of these is that functional stupidity can become self-reinforcing. This 
happens when employees stop asking searching questions and are rewarded with a sense 
of (false) certainty about their own careers and about the organization as a whole. This 
can produce a sense of functionality for the individual and the organization. By this we 
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mean, there is a shared sense that aspects of organizational life are operating efficiently 
and effectively. For instance, experience of certainty might also be accompanied by more 
material rewards such as promotions, pay-rises and smooth organizational performance. 
When this sense of certainty (and the accompanying performance) is threatened by 
difficult questions or contradictions, organizational members often seek to protect it by 
retreating into deeper functional stupidity. In other words, the individual learns gradually 
not to think in certain dimensions and domains. Such a move can entail reinforcing one’s 
faith in managerially sponsored discourses. By doing so, organizational members and the 
organization as a whole seek salvation from the potentially identity-threatening, disorder-
creating and uncertainty-inducing consequences. It means also that organizational 
members are able to reaffirm the continued smooth functioning of the organization and 
their own compliance and career paths within it. This can create a self-reinforcing loop of 
more functional stupidity leading to more (illusory) certainty and smooth operations. A 
kind of reflexive laziness or incapacity follows. However, this can be accompanied by 
diligence and intellectual sharpness in other respects: significant creative and intellectual 
work can go into optimizing means for the accomplishment of (given) objectives.  
 
Functional stupidity is not just self-reinforcing. As mentioned above, there are some 
cases when widespread functional stupidity can create less positive outcomes in the form 
of dissonance. Often such dysfunctional outcomes are minor and are overlooked in order 
to preserve a positive sense of self and the organization as a whole. However, there are 
instances when the dissonance between the rather narrow commitments encouraged by 
functional stupidity, and the outcomes, becomes so great that it is impossible to ignore. 
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This prompts reflexivity. Reflexivity in individuals occurs when their experiences clash 
with their own self- and/or organizational identity narratives. Such clashes can often 
spark pronounced rounds of self-reflexivity, the search for broader justifications and 
broader substantive reasoning about desired ends. Sometimes this leads to the response: 
‘How could I have been so stupid!’ But less drastic experiences and responses are also 
common. For instance, professionals facing unemployment were prompted to engage in 
deep and often profoundly self-reflexivity when thinking about their future (Gabriel, 
2010). Although such self-examination often proves painful, it can certainly undermine 
dynamics of functional stupidity. There are some cases where organizations actually 
encourage individual reflexivity that induces negative feedback. For example, in an 
attempt to recruit an executive from another industry, a senior executive asked a Pepsi 
executive: ‘Do you want to continue to sell sweetened water for the rest of your life’? 
(Sculley, 1987). Similarly, direct selling companies often seek to recruit and motivate 
members by encouraging them to reflect on the dissatisfying ‘rut’ that is their everyday 
work life (Pratt, 2000). By doing this, existing commitments are shaken up and processes 
of internal reflectivity are prompted (and sometimes prompt shut down or sale of the 
company). 
 
As well as undermining functional stupidity at an individual level, negative outcomes can 
have profound implications for the whole organization. When organizations make 
mistakes visible and risk public critique, they are sometimes prompted or even obliged to 
engage in a process of collective self-reflexivity. These processes occur particularly 
following mistakes that lead to major disasters. Many well-know corporate disasters and 
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accidents (e.g. Gephart, 1993; Brown, 2000) or financial improprieties (e.g. Brown, 
2004) have prompted in-depth inquiries. These inquiries sometimes give rise to profound 
processes of self-reflection, more substantive questions and the search for broader 
justifications. For instance, during an inquiry into changes in an Australian public 
broadcaster, broader questions were asked about the organization’s existence, its identity 
and its goals (Spicer, 2005). However, inquiries can also become forums where groups 
seek to avoid deeper and more searching questions, side-step fundamentally systematic 
changes, and ensure a return to ‘business as usual’. For instance, recent government 
inquiries into the failures in the UK banking sector during the 2008 global financial crisis 
frequently revealed leaders of financial institutions seeking to avoid responsibility and 
self-reflection that would result in profound changes to the way the financial system 
operates (Whittle and Mueller, 2012). Public inquiries are by no means the only forums 
that allow deeper collective self-reflexivity, the search for justification and substantive 
reasoning. There are many other spaces within and around organizations that can host 
stupidity-disturbing dialogue. These include broader social movements (Spicer and 
Böhm, 2007), insurgent movements within organizations (Creed et al., 2002), the media 
(Pattriota et al., 2011) and even leaders who are willing to open up broader reflection on 
fundamental assumptions within an organization (Hatch, 2011). Although such dialogue 
may actually act to reinforce or perhaps side-step fundamental questions, it at least can 
act as a space that potentially could undermine functional stupidity by prompting 
processes of individual reflexivity and (partially) unblocking collective communicative 






Management and organization studies abound with positive-sounding reports of the 
importance of well educated and bright workers in knowledge-based firms that are at the 
forefront of the knowledge economy. There is ‘a broad consensus that modern economies 
are becoming increasingly knowledge-intensive’ (Adler, 2001, p. 216). Many assume that 
being able to put knowledge to work intelligently seems to the essence of what 
(successful) organizations do (Kogut and Zander, 1992). We have argued that the field 
assumption of ‘smartness’ underpins a broad and somewhat diverse set of ideas about 
organizations. It emphasizes the significance of the sophisticated use of cognitive 
resources in contemporary organizations. We think this assumption calls for significant 
reservation, nuance and qualification (e.g. Alvesson, 2004, 2013a; Böhm, 2005; Fleming 
et al., 2004; Sweet and Meiksins, 2008; Thompson et al., 2001). The dominant 
descriptions are often glamorous and pretentious. Furthermore, we think the consensus in 
this broad field needs to be challenged – perhaps key developments and contemporary 
conditions also mean that modern economies and organizations become more ‘stupidity-
intensive’? 
 
To develop this challenge, we have tried to offer something different by drawing 
attention to the significance of functional stupidity in organizations. Our understanding of 
functional stupidity is that it emerges from the interplay between unwillingness and a 
(learned) incapacity to engage in reflexivity, a partial closing of the mind, freezing of the 
intellectual effort, a narrowed focus, and an absence of requests for justification. It means 
41 
 
buying into questionable, but symbolically appealing claims about contemporary 
organizational structures and practices dominated by knowledge-intensity, visionary 
leadership and post-bureaucracy. Functional stupidity includes a (wilful) lack of 
recognition of the incompleteness and uncertainty of our knowledge and the frequently 
debatable nature of dominant goals and dominant logics. As such, it works as a doubt-
control and uncertainty-coping mechanism. Functional stupidity can help to marginalize 
sources of friction and uncertainty. However, in our view, what is crucial is that 
functional stupidity is not just an aberration in organizational life. In many cases it is 
central insofar as it is supported by organizational norms, and facilitates smooth 
interactions in organizations. Being clever and knowledgeable is fine and necessary, but 
so is refraining from being reflexive, avoiding asking for justifications for decisions and 
structures and minimizing substantive reasoning about values and goals. In this sense, 
functional stupidity can be helpful in producing results - for organizations as well as for 
individuals. It is productive because it cuts short costly and anxiety inducing questions 
and creates a sense of certainty. In this sense, it is a pillar of organizational order. While 
functional stupidity comes with many benefits, it can also create significant risks for 
individuals as well as organizations as a whole. Functional stupidity can backfire by 
creating a sense of dissonance: increasingly yawning gaps between shared assumptions 
and reality may eventually produce accidents or disasters. So functional stupidity may not 
always be entirely functional. The contradiction in the term implies this and points to the 
internal tension in the concept. Functionality indicates the potential benefits. Stupidity 
draws attention to the risks and problems involved. Like many things in organizational 
life, it is a mixed blessing – at once, functional and stupid. This makes it important and 
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interesting to consider and monitor, both academically and practically in organizations. 
 
By articulating the concept of functional stupidity, we seek to go beyond existing 
accounts of the limits to ‘smartness’ in organizations. In particular, we have pointed out 
that the shortage of reflection, critical thinking and requests for justification is not an 
unavoidable contingency created by bounded rationality (March and Simon, 1958), the 
chaotic nature of organizations (Cohen et al., 1972), environmental uncertainty (March, 
1996), widely shared cognitive scripts (Ashforth and Fried, 1988), or the nature of 
modern professionalized expertise and specialized knowledge (Ungar, 2008). We see 
functional stupidity as being created not through intellectual deficits but through political 
expediency and the operation of power. To put this another way, organizational members 
become functionally stupid through a series of cultural and institutional beliefs and 
arrangements salient in an economy of persuasion, and framing reinforced by managerial 
(and self-managerial) interventions (such as encouraging a narrow action orientation, the 
celebration of leadership, attachment to structure, a strong belief in institutions) which 
discourage reflexivity, substantive reasoning and justification. This happens through a 
combination of indirect and more systemic stupidity management, and more direct forms 
of episodic stupidity management, and stupidity self-management. Each of these 
interventions discourages critical reasoning, substantive concern and requests for 
justification. This can create a strong system of control that produces highly functional 
outcomes. In this sense our account of functional stupidity helps to show how structures 
of control can work by limiting or constraining knowledge and rationality, rather than, as 
many Foucauldian scholars would claim, just ‘producing’ it (e.g. Knights et al., 1993; 
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Flyvbjerg, 1998; Clegg et al., 2006) 
 
We do not see ourselves as immune to functional stupidity. We see functional stupidity as 
a general condition that pervades many spheres of social life (Alvesson, 2013a; Foley, 
2010), including academia. Contemporary academia could be seen as a hothouse for 
functional stupidity. In academia, huge amounts of time and energy are expended on 
writing papers for publication in top ranked journals, in our bid to ‘play the game’. These 
paper may be read or used by very few, and mainly by those eager to pad out the 
reference lists attached to their own papers (Gabriel, 2010). Rarely is there any serious 
discourse around the meaningfulness of this enterprise (cf. Grey, 2010), apart from 
occasional debates about ‘relevance’ (e.g. Keiser and Leiner, 2009; Hodgkinson and 
Rousseau, 2009). Perhaps this is because publications are not only a measure of our 
‘market value’ but also are seen as an expression of our intelligence and knowledge. The 
result of an article being accepted for publication can be a deep sense of satisfaction and 
strong identity-confirmation, simply because it ‘proves’ how smart we are. Of course 
there are material rewards, but these are often less important than the symbolic ones. One 
could say that functional stupidity is a key resource for any institution eager to maximize 
careerism. This can make researchers into willing journal paper technicians who focus on 
writing papers for leading journals within a narrow subfield. This may detract from 
broader scholarship with slower and less predictable results and, perhaps, with a greater 





To sum up, this paper makes three contributions. Firstly, our concepts of functional 
stupidity and stupidity management have some potential to shake up dominant 
assumptions about the significance of knowledge, intelligence, creativity, learning and 
the general use of cognitive resources. We see this literature as one-sided and ideological 
and in need of opening up through consideration of something quite different. Secondly, 
we provide a different assumptions by proposing the notion of functional stupidity. In 
doing so, we highlighted how organizations cultivate functional stupidity and propose a 
framework for its operation. Thirdly, we have sketched some ideas for research in this 
area, to encourage investigation of avoidance of critical reasoning, blocking of 
communicative action and curtailing of the internal conversation. 
 
Implications for Research and Practice  
 
The concept of functional stupidity addresses an aspect of organizational life that, to date, 
has been largely ignored by researchers. We think it offers a number of interesting 
avenues for future research.  
 
First, it would be interesting to explore how functional stupidity plays out in different 
contexts such as emotionally intensive (e.g. caring organizations), aesthetically intensive 
(e.g. hospitality), process intensive (e.g. routine services work) and knowledge-intensive 
(e.g. universities, high tech firms). It might be particularly interesting to study 
organizations and work where contribution to the social good is disputed, such as 
advertising, fashion, tobacco or the arms industries. Such investigation would require 
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comparative case studies in a range of different sectors or work contexts. Second, we do 
not know how functional stupidity changes and evolves over time. Paying attention to 
this temporal dimension might demonstrate how functional stupidity increases or falls 
depending on aspects such as organization age, degree of institutionalization, emergence 
of a new fashion, and whether the organization faces a relatively benign or a crisis ridden 
context. Third, it would be of interest to see how individuals develop over time in terms 
of the ability and willingness to think critically, to reflect more deeply and to raise issues 
that are experienced as problematic and call for justification. Are neophytes more 
inclined towards independent thinking and to require justifications, or does experience, a 
broader overview and greater confidence lead to such an orientation? Fourth, it would be 
interesting to study whether and how use of reason and functional stupidity co-exist or 
interact. Future research could explore the relation between organization processes that 
facilitate the use of knowledge for functional purposes, and processes that encourage 
organizational members to abstain from reflection, thinking beyond instrumental 
concerns or asking critical questions about the reasons for organizational practice. Fifth, 
it is uncertain what happens if there is a mismatch in functional stupidity between 
organization and individual. Exploring this tension might reveal how ‘smart’ people 
survive in ‘stupid’ firms and how ‘stupid’ people make their way in ‘smart’ 
organizations. Finally, there are some methodological challenges associated with 
studying functional stupidity. Simply explaining the concept to respondents and asking 
for their responses is one option. This would help to test the face validity and 
applicability of the concept. However, a more oblique way to capturing functional 
stupidity could involve asking questions about doubt, reflections, requirements for 
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justification and experience, and talking about lack of meaning and purpose at work. 
Respondents could be asked probing questions about their own experience of 
meaningfulness and meaninglessness at work, and their efforts to critically and 
reflectively raise issues and initiate discussion. Respondents could also be asked for their 
opinions on whether their counterparts engage in reflection, critical questioning, request 
justifications, or protest at what is seen as irrational or unethical arrangements and acts.  
 
In addition to providing a range of new questions for investigation, our argument has 
some implications for practice. The primary inference of our study is that it calls into 
question one-sided notions of knowledge as well as broader, smartness-based ideas. By 
recognizing the role played by functional stupidity, we hope to promote a more humble 
attitude in organizational settings which frequently emphasize knowledge-intensiveness 
and general smartness. A second implication is a reminder to practitioners that stupidity 
in organizational life is not necessarily an aberration. Rather it is a frequent and 
organizationally produced norm. We hope to encourage a recognition among 
practitioners that what might appear to be an act of stupidity may not be due to an 
individual’s cognitive deficiencies, but to active stupidity management. We hope that if 
practitioners are able to recognize the various promoters of stupidity, they may be able to 
reflect and possible reconsider the stupidity management practices in their own 
organizations. We hope also that such reflection may help practitioners to make greater 
use of anti-stupidity management – or at least to work in different and better ways. Third, 
we have shown that stupidity should not be rooted out of the organization completely: it 
can be an important resource that organizations should cultivate, maintain and engineer. 
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In many cases, a dose of functional stupidity is what is required. Employing very highly 
qualified people may be a disservice to them and to the organization. Supporting a degree 
of functional stupidity is an important managerial task. Fourth, and counter to the 
previous point, managers should seek to guard against excess functional stupidity. We 
have pointed out that while functional stupidity may help organizations to function, it can 
have negative consequences such as disappointment and failures. In order to avoid these, 
practitioners must be willing strategically to inject some aspects of critical thinking into 
organizational life. This will help to unsettle forms of functional stupidity that have 
become too ingrained. In this sense, a central task for many managers is to strike a 
balance between the intelligent use of knowledge on the one hand, and propagation of 
functional stupidity on the other. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we hope that the 
concept of functional stupidity will facilitate more critical reflection on smart 
organizations. In particular, we hope to prompt wider debate about why it is that smart 
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Figure One: A Model of Functional Stupidity 
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